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Six Theories of Neoliberalism 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
This paper takes as its starting point the observation that neoliberalism is a concept 
that is ‘oft-invoked but ill-defined’ (Mudge 2008: 703). It provides a taxonomy of 
uses of the term neoliberalism to include: (1) an all-purpose denunciatory category; 
(2) ‘the way things are’; (3) a particular institutional framework characterizing Anglo-
American forms of national capitalism; (4) a dominant ideology of global capitalism; 
(5) a form of governmentality and hegemony; and (6) a variant within the broad 
framework of liberalism as both theory and policy discourse. It is argued that this 
sprawling set of definitions are not mutually compatible, and that uses of the term 
need to be dramatically narrowed from its current association with anything and 
everything that a particular author may find objectionable. In particular, it is argued 
that the uses of the term by Michel Foucault in his 1978-79 lectures, found in The 
Birth of Biopolitics (Foucault, 2008) are not particularly compatible with its more 
recent status as a variant of dominant ideology or hegemony theories.  
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Introduction: The Take-off of Neoliberalism 
 
There can be little doubt about the take-off in the use of the term neoliberalism. From 
being a term that was rarely used prior to the early 1990s, it has become a ubiquitous 
concept in critical discourse. Data from the Google ‘culturomics’ app – which 
identifies lexical analysis of the 15 million-plus books that had been scanned into the 
Google library in 2012 – identified a nine-fold increase in identification of the word 
‘neoliberalism’ in its collection between 1990 and 2007 (see Figure 1). This is easily 
confirmed by any database search: a keyword search of my own university’s 
electronic databases drew me to 28,126 results: articles in question referred to 
‘Enjoying Neoliberalism’ (Dean 2008); ‘Burying Neoliberalism’ (Andrews 2009); 
‘Narrating Neoliberalism’ (McNeill 2005); ‘Magical Neoliberalism’ (Fuguet 2001); 
‘Neoliberalism and Literary Discourse’ (Costa 2010); ‘Neoliberalism, Performativity, 
and Research’ (Roberts 2007); ‘Queering Chineseness, Unthinking Neoliberalism’ 
(Wong 2008); ‘The Soul of Neoliberalism’ (Moreton 2007); ‘The End of 
Neoliberalism’ (Grantham and Miller 2009), and much, much more. The range of 
academic journals and disciplinary bases from which such articles appear is also 
highly eclectic. While neoliberalism as a concept has its origins in economics, its 
influence has extended far and wide across the humanities and social sciences (c.f. 
Kipnis 2007; Mudge 2008; Boas and Morse 2009).  
 
It is the inclusiveness and apparent interdisciplinarity of the term neoliberalism that 
accounts for part of its appeal. The extent to which it has displaced earlier terms can 
be seen from Figure 1 in the relationship of the term to the term ‘monetarism’. As the 
figure indicates, monetarism was a widely used term in the 1970s and 1980s, 
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particularly associated with critiques of the policies of the Thatcher government in the 
UK and the Reagan administration in the US. Yet the use of the term declines in the 
1990s and 2000s, and its decline coincides with the rise of neoliberalism as a common 
term. One of the difficulties with a concept such as monetarism was that, at some 
level, it does require an understanding of technical aspects of economic theory 
(particularly in the relationship it posits between the money supply and interest rates) 
that is unlikely to be possessed outside of the economics discipline. By contrast, a 
working understanding of what neoliberalism is seems to have developed in a range 
of disciplines, with a strong degree of confidence about the use of the term. The term 
‘neoliberalism’ has been able to move easily through the arts and humanities 
disciplines, in ways that terms grounded more specifically in economics, such as 
monetarism, or politics, such as the ‘new right’, cannon. 
 
Insert Figure 1 here 
 
In this paper, I attempt to give some order and coherence to these many and varied 
used of the term neoliberalism. I will begin by noting that much of the usage of the 
term is intellectually unsustainable, particularly where it functions as an all-purpose 
denunciatory category for anything and everything, or where it is simply invoked as 
“the way things are”. I will then consider two more sustainable uses of the term: as a 
technique of government prevalent in the Anglo-American economies, and as the 
currently prevalent form of the dominant ideology. I will not at this point some of the 
debates about dominant ideology theories, before considering an approach derived 
from the work of Michel Foucault, but which grounds his work more specifically in a 
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Marxist approach (Marxist-Foucauldians), and some more specific observations on 
Foucault’s The Birth of Biopolitics itself (Foucault 2008).  
 
In order to retain any utility, the uses of the term neoliberalism have to be, as Mitchell 
Dean (2010: 1) has noted ‘circumscribed to a limited range of schools or forms of 
thought and … practices and policies concerned with the construction of market and 
market-like relations’ in the political-economic space. This means steering away from 
using it as a synonym for neo-Marxist hegemony theory, or as the dominant ideology 
of globalising capitalism. Foucault’s account of neoliberalism provides an interesting 
case study of the relationship between ideas and institutional change, developed along 
what I would describe as more Weberian than Marxist lines. It has also been 
considerably more subtle in applications than simple binary oppositions between 
individualism and collectivism, public and private, and the market and the state would 
suggest.  
 
1. Neoliberalism as an all-purpose denunciatory category 
 
I have observed elsewhere (Flew 2012a) that, despite the warnings of early theorists 
of neoliberalism such as Andrew Gamble (2000: 134) to avoid ‘a tendency to reify 
neo-liberalism and to treat it as a phenomenon which manifests itself everywhere and 
in everything’, this is in fact what has happened over the last decade. Donald Nonini 
has made the similar observation that ‘the term “neo-liberal” has recently appeared so 
frequently, and been applied with such abandon, that it risks being used to refer to 
almost any political, economic, social or cultural process associated with 
contemporary capitalism’ (Nonini 2008: 149). My own audit has identified the term 
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being used to associate neoliberalism with neo-liberalism has been associated with: 
the rising popularity of Bollywood-style weddings (Kapur 2009); the prevalence of 
violence in recent Australian cinema (Stratton 2009); standardised national 
educational curricula and national testing (Apple 2004); the redevelopment of Dubai 
(Davis 2007); the performative sexuality of the character of Mr. Garrison in the 
animated comedy series South Park (Gournelos 2009); and the privileging of access 
to databases over space for books in Australian public libraries (McQueen 2009). It is 
frequently invoked as the larger malevolent force that lies behind the rise of various 
reality television programs, including Big Brother (Couldry 2010: 77-78), Masterchef 
(Seale 2012) and – of course – The Apprentice (McGuigan 2010). It also seems to be 
particularly associated with contemporary university management, having been 
identified as the modus operandi of both the University of California (Butler 2009) 
and the University of Sydney (Connell 2011), to take two examples.   
 
This literature is difficult to summarize, as the uses of the term ‘neoliberalism’ are 
highly diffuse, but it largely functions here as a rhetorical trope, where the meaning is 
already known to those who would be interested in the topic in question. For example, 
Kapur (2009) goes to some lengths to explain the rituals involved in a Bollywood-
style Indian wedding, but at no point is neoliberalism defined or explained in this 
article, presumably because both the author and the journal editors could assume that 
the readers all basically understood what it meant. A representative example of how 
the term is used in this literature an be found in a recent essay by radical educational 
theorist Henry Giroux: 
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With the advent of neoliberalism, or what some call free-market 
fundamentalism, we have witnessed the production and widespread adoption 
within educational theory and practice of what I want to call the politics of 
economic Darwinism. As a theater of cruelty and mode of public pedagogy, 
economic Darwinism undermines most forms of solidarity while promoting 
the logic of unchecked competition and unbridled individualism. As the 
welfare state is dismantled, it is increasingly replaced by the harsh realities of 
the punishing state as social problems are increasingly criminalized and social 
protections are either eliminated or fatally weakened (Giroux 2010: 1).  
 
Giroux’s statement is characteristic of the genre, in that any attempt to question ore 
principles here (‘economic Darwinism’, ‘free-market fundamentalism’, ‘theatre of 
cruelty’), would leave one exposed to the claim that you are simply endorsing that 
which he critiques, and are hence politically compromised. Clearly, one could not 
subject the claims made here to any Popperian criteria of falsifiability, meaning that 
readers of such work probably know well in advance whether or not they agree with 
the work in question. As a result, and perhaps not surprisingly, those who see a 
positive economic role for markets completely reject such arguments, and indeed the 
whole terms in which the debate has been constructed. Mitchell Dean noted that the 
Institute for Public Affairs, an Australian pro-market think tank, describes neo-
liberalism as ‘a leftist version of the secret handshake; a signal that the reader is with 
fellow travellers’ (Dean 2010: 1).  
 
More ideologically neutral observers, such as Boas and Gans-Morse, observe that the 
term has a ‘negative normative valence’, and that ‘neo-liberalism has come to signify 
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a radical form of market fundamentalism with which no one wants to be associated’ 
(Boas and Gans-Morse 2009: 138). Paradoxically, they observe that the denunciatory 
force associated with the use of the term neo-liberalism is in inverse proportion to the 
extent to which it has a shared meaning in the academic literature: ‘the term is 
effectively used in different ways, such that its appearance in any given article offers 
little clue as to what it actually means’ (Boas and Gans-Morse 2009: 139).  
 
One of the curious features of this generic literature on neo-liberalism is that it almost 
presumes that political form does not matter. For a literature that puts such an 
emphasis upon the politics of knowledge, explicit consideration of formal politics is 
largely absent from the discussion. It would appear not to matter, for instance, which 
political party is in power in any given country, since all are presumed to the broader 
project of neo-liberalism. This would be consistent with a certain reading of Marxist 
political theory, which proposes that all mainstream political parties are constrained 
by their commitment to the maintenance of capitalism, but it is rare for the discussion 
in much of this work to even go that far. If Giroux’s work is taken as indicative, 
politics is associated with outspoken criticism by public intellectuals rather than any 
tangible engagement with conventional politics or with the institutions of government. 
Instead, neoliberalism as a term largely functions here as a ‘conceptual trash heap 
capable of accommodating multiple distasteful phenomena without much argument as 
to whether one or the other component really belongs’ (Boas and Gans-Morse 2009: 
156).  
 
Clive Barnett has observed that this totalizing account of neoliberalism ‘understood 
primarily as an economic doctrine of free markets and individual choice’, results in ‘a 
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peculiar convergence between the radical academic left and the right-wing 
interpretation of liberal thought exemplified by Hayekian conservatism’ (Barnett 
2005; 11). It fails to account for institutional diversity or innovation within 
governmental practice, instead remaining within a largely normative terrain about 
what constitutes the ideal society. The debate about neoliberalism typically reverts to 
a first-principles debate about the pros and cons of liberalism as a political ideology. 
With the concept of neoliberalism being ‘oft-invoked but ill-defined’ (Mudge 2008: 
703), yet in principle capable of explaining everything from reality television to 
university restructuring, there is the attendant risk of producing what Bruno Latour 
(2004: 229) terms ‘conspiracy theories’ and Gibson-Graham (2008: 618) refer to as 
‘paranoid theorizing’, where there are forces that are large, dark, relentless and all-
encompassing that constitute the underlying source of explanation of everything.  
 
2. Neoliberalism as ‘the way things are’ 
 
If critics of neoliberalism downplay the significance of political institutions in their 
various accounts, those who support greater economic liberalism give them a very 
significant role. Public choice theorists have long stressed a range of political factors 
in driving up state expenditures, including: interest group activism; “pork barreling” 
by vested political interests; the role of political representatives in directing funds to 
their own constituencies; bureaucratic empire-building; and institutional entropy in 
large departments, where incremental approaches to budgeting create an innate 
tendency towards growth rather than cutbacks in the number of activities undertaken 
(Dunleavy and O’Leary 1987: 95-117; Dryzek and Dunleavy 2009: 108-119). They 
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also draw attention to the extent to which such ideas have gained traction, not simply 
by being taken up by parties of the political right, but by those of the centre-left.  
 
Bill Clinton’s declaration to ‘end welfare as we know it’ in the 1990s was a famous 
example of this, but perhaps the best known was Labour Prime Minister Jim 
Callaghan declaring the end of Keynesianism in Great Britain three years before 
Margaret Thatcher came to power. Addressing the 1976 Labour Party Confernece, 
Callaghan observed that ‘We used to think you could spend your way out of a 
recession and increase employment by cutting taxes and boosting government 
spending. I can tell you in all candour that that option no longer exists’ (quoted in 
Sassoon 1996: 500). More recently, Tony Blair’s best-selling autobiography A 
Journey provides many statements endorsing what would seem to be a neo-liberal 
political direction. In the Postscript to A Journey, Blair rejects the claim that the 
financial meltdown of 2008 proved the failure of the market. Instead, he argued: 
 
Progressives have to be proud of policies that lead to efficiency as much as 
those that lead to justice. Why? Because the lesson learned since 1945 is that 
driving value for money through public services is not a question of being 
efficient rather than just – it is just. … This will focus especially on the role of 
the state, which is why it is so important not to misread the political 
consequences of the financial crisis. Big-state politics today will fail. In fact if 
you offer ‘big state vs. small state’, small will win. Even now, after the crisis. 
Progressives have to transcend that choice, and offer a concept of the state that 
actively empowers people to make their own choices and does not try to do it 
for them. (Blair 2010: 685-686).  
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Many critics of the “New Labour” project would of course find such an apologia to 
be typical of Tony Blair. Keith Tribe has argued that although the neoliberal policy 
agenda is now discredited, it is ‘now so deeply embedded in the reflexes of the 
world’s ruling elites and line managers that they have difficulty conceiving the world 
in any other way’ (Tribe 2009: 694), and Tony Blair may be a case in point. But his 
position is not an isolated one, as the question of ‘value for money through public 
services’, and how to best achieve it in an era of multiple competing claims on state 
resources, and as global financial markets set limits to deficit financing at the level of 
national governments. As the Australian social democratic thinker Hugh Stretton has 
observed: 
 
When [markets] work as they should, especially where they work without 
generating undue inequalities of wealth and power, Left thinkers should value 
them as highly as any privatizer does. Indeed, more highly: the Left has such 
necessary tasks for government, and so much to lose from inefficient or 
oppressive bureaucracy, that it should economise bureaucracy every way they 
can (Stretton 1987: 27).  
 
3. Neoliberalism as a Policy Doctrine of the English-Speaking World 
 
When Tony Blair refers to ‘the voters’ choosing the ‘small state’ when confronted 
with ‘big state versus small state’ questions, he is of course referring to British voters. 
But as Figure 2 indicates, the preference is very likely country-specific. Voters in 
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countries such as Austria, Belgium, France, Italy and Sweden have had levels of 
government spending exceeding 50 per cent of GDP for a number of years, and in the 
case of Sweden, have maintained such levels in spite of significant reductions in the 
overall size of the state since the 1980s. By contrast, countries such as the United 
States, Switzerland and Japan have stayed consistently below this average. While 
some countries, such as Britain, Canada and The Netherlands showed significant 
variation in the proportion of GDP accounted for by government spending over this 
period, there is at the same time considerable stability over time among many of the 
countries, and the overall average has shown only a modest level of increase over the 
period – from 43.8 per cent in 1980 to 47.7 per cent in 2009 – while accommodating 
wide levels of variation between countries, with only limited evidence of any 
convergence toward the mean. 1 
 
Insert Figure 2 here 
 
The noted absence of any “optimal” size for the public sector in capitalist economies 
draws attention to the literature on the institutional diversity of capitalist economies. 
As Richard Nelson has observed, the fact that so many countries share the core 
characteristics of capitalism of being primarily based around a market economy, and a 
belief than market organization provides the primary and best means of allocating 
goods and services, obscured the ‘complex and variegated ways that economic 
activity is actually governed … [which] is both a source and a consequence of 
considerable political debate about the appropriate governance of various economic 
activities and sectors’ (Nelson 2011: 1). One of the features of studies of the 
institutional diversity of capitalist societies, or the ‘varieties of capitalism’ literature 
 14 
(Lane and Wood 2009) is that economic globalization is not leading to policy 
convergence (Drezner 2001), even in those policy fields that relate most directly to 
the activities of multinational corporations (Morgan 2009). This is even before we 
consider the diverse ways in which political and cultural forces impact upon market 
organization, institutional behaviour, and practices of economic governance, an 
observation now readily conceded by mainstream economists through the new 
institutional economics (North 1990; Williamson 2000).  
 
From this perspective, neoliberalism may be one political ideology of capitalist 
organization that co-exists with others. It has been argued, for instance, that neoliberal 
ideas have most readily taken root in the English-speaking world and that, for a 
variety of reasons, are less influential in other capitalist societies, such as those of 
continental Europe and East Asia (Morgan 2009). In this respect, then, the critique of 
neoliberalism may be less an assault on market society tout court, and be more about 
a demand that policy-makers in countries such as the United States, Britain and 
Australia give more attention to policy ideas developed elsewhere that have a more 
collectivist frame of reference. Fore example, Pusey (2010: 14) has argued that ‘the 
evidence points … to the relative under-performance, based on conventional 
economic criteria, of the Anglophone hardline neo-liberal nations when compared to 
the social-democratic nations of Western Europe’. There is also an intense debate 
about the wider implications of the rise of China and the East Asian economies for the 
future of market capitalism (Hutton 2006; Jacques 2009). However, this debate about 
neoliberalism as one of a number of competing ideas about the organization of 
capitalist economies and societies has been largely overwhelmed by those arguments 
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that present neoliberalism as the ascendant ideology of globalizing capitalism, so that 
the world is seen as being, or becoming, more and more neoliberal.  
 
4. Neoliberalism as the Dominant Ideology of Global Capitalism 
 
The clearest perspective on what neoliberalism is comes from Marxist political 
economy. At its most straightforward, as presented by Harvey (2005), neoliberalism 
is the ideological project of a resurgent political right that gained ascendancy in the 
United States under Ronald Reagan and Britain under Margaret Thatcher in the 
1980s, after the crises of the late-Keynesian era in the 1970s. It was able to spread its 
influence globally through control over dominant international institutions, such as 
the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and the World Trade Organisation: 
the term ‘neoliberalism’ itself was popularized by economist John Williamson in his 
policy advice to these institutions on the conditions to be attached to financial support 
for economic restructuring in developing nations (Steger and Roy 2011: 19-20). In 
advancing the neoliberal agenda globally, its advocates were aided by the collapse of 
the communist economies of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe in the late 1980s, 
and by the “Third Way” movement associated with leaders such as Bill Clinton in the 
U.S., Tony Blair in Britain, and Gerhard Schroder in Germany, who sought to move 
their centre-left parties in more “market friendly” directions.  
 
Neoliberalism is identified here as a political ideology associated with economic 
globalization and the rise of financial capitalism, as Keynesianism was associated 
with national capitalism in a monopolistic phase as it evolved from the 1930s to the 
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1970s, and classical liberalism with the competitive capitalism of the 19th century 
(Dumenil and Levy 2011; Overbeek and van Apeldoorn 2012). It has been defined in 
the following ways: 
 
Neoliberalism is in the first instance a theory of political economic practices 
that proposes that human well being can best be advanced by liberating 
individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional 
framework characterized by strong property rights, free markets and free 
trade. The role of the state is to create and preserve an institutional framework 
appropriate to such practices (Harvey 2005: 2).  
 
We define neoliberalism as a political project aimed to restore capitalist class 
power in the aftermath of the economic and social crises of the 1970s and the 
challenge posed to the rule of capital globally by the call for a New 
International Economic Order … The neoliberal project is characterised by a 
mix of liberal pro-market and supply side discourses (laissez-faire, 
privatization, liberalization, deregulation, competitiveness) and of monetarist 
orthodoxy (price stability, balanced budgets, austerity) (van Apeldoorn and 
Overbeek 2012: 4-5).  
 
Neoliberalism is being used consistently here, in that it is first and foremost an 
economic discourse. It is proposed that the appeal of market-based solutions to 
economic problems was highlighted in the 1970s as state planning and expert-led 
processes proved to be less able to address various ‘wicked problems’ of public policy 
(Rittel and Webber 1973), and as new problems emerged, such as simultaneous price 
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inflation and rising underemployment, which had not been considered possible in 
Keynesian economic theories. Harvey observes that this impasse opened up the scope 
for new economic ideas to gain sway, which were a complex fusion of theories 
including monetarism, rational expectations theories, public choice theory, supply-
side economics and others, which had a commonality to their arguments that 
‘government intervention was the problem rather than the solution, and that a stable 
monetary policy, plus radical tax cuts in the top brackets, would provide a healthier 
economy by getting the incentives for entrepreneurial activity aligned correctly’ 
(Harvey 2005: 54).  
 
Such ideas found a base in leading university economics departments, and were 
propagated by various think tanks (e.g. Institute for Economic Affairs and the Adam 
Smith Institute in the U.K., American Enterprise Institute, Heritage Foundation and 
others in the U.S.), as well as in the business media. Such ideas found hospitable 
political leaders in Ronald Reagan in the United States and Margaret Thatcher in 
Britain, but they could not have gained and held power dimply on the basis of their 
economic doctrines. The literature on this ‘New Right’ emphaised the ability of these 
leaders to articulate their economic ideas to other powerful currents of thought, such 
as politically conservative Christianity in the U.S. and opposition to trade union 
power in Britain; in both cases, a resurgent nationalism was also identified as an 
important accompaniment of the rise of neoliberal political ideologies (Harvey 2005: 
85-86, 195-196). The manner in which the Communist states of the Soviet Union and 
Eastern Europe collapsed under the weight of popular discontent and poor economic 
performance in the 1980s also gave considerable sway to arguments that free market 
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capitalism had proven to be a superior political-economic system to those that had 
been its alternatives. 
 
The account of neoliberalism developed by Harvey and others is recognizable in 
Marxist political economic as a dominant ideology theory. Dominant ideology 
theories come in more or less complex variants, from the simple economic 
determinism found in Marx’s observation in The German Ideology that ‘the class 
which is the ruling material force in society, is at the same time its ruling intellectual 
force’, to the more complex proposition developed in A Contribution to the Critique 
of Political Economy that ‘the mode of production of material life conditions the 
social, political and intellectual life process in general’ (quoted in Flew 2007: 33-34). 
Harvey proposes a relationship between economy and ideology that is relatively 
simple, whereby a resurgent ruling class was able to capture the dominant cultural and 
state institutions and thus impose their ideas to secure popular consent. He posits that: 
 
Powerful ideological influences circulated through the corporations, the 
media, and the numerous institutions that constitute civil society—such as the 
universities, schools, churches, and professional associations.  The “long 
march” through these institutions … the capture of certain segments of the 
media, and the conversion of many intellectuals to neoliberal ways of 
thinking, created a climate of opinion in support of neoliberalism as the 
exclusive guarantor of freedom. These movements were later consolidated 
through the capture of political parties and, ultimately, state power (Harvey 
2005: 40).  
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This version of dominant ideology theory has been described by John Thompson as 
the ‘symbolic glue’ approach, where ‘the dominant ideology provides the symbolic 
glue … which unifies the social order and binds individuals to it’, and ‘is a symbolic 
system which, by incorporating individuals from all strata into the social order, helps 
to reproduce a social order which serves the interests of dominant groups’ (Thompson 
1990: 90-91). An associated concept is the correspondence interpretation of ideas and 
culture – at any given historical conjuncture, cultural forms will correspond to 
dominant political-economic interests, thereby securing the power of the dominant 
groups through what Harvey terms ‘the construction of consent’.  
 
When presented in this form, the dominant ideology thesis has been open to a range 
of critiques. Abercrombie and Turner (1978) questioned whether subordinate classes 
in capitalist societies have ever really believed in the ‘dominant ideology’, arguing 
that in so far as a dominant ideology has relevance, it is more important in providing a 
coherent set of beliefs for dominant groups themselves. Moreover, in a line of 
thinking going back to Daniel Bell (1976), sociologists such as Boltanski and 
Chiapello (2008) have observed that moral rebelliousness and avant-garde 
sensibilities can very much co-exist with the broader pattern of capitalist economic 
relations. 
 
Given the uncertainty surrounding what “society” can be said to “believe” at any 
point in time, one proxy that is sometimes used is the propensity for working class 
people to vote for political parties, such as the Republican Party in the United States 
or the Conservative Party in Britain, whose policy objectives would appear to be at 
odds with working class interests (Harvey 2005: 48-51; Hall 1988). But as Paul Hirst 
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(1990) argued, this reading of longer-term trends from particular election results is 
inherently risky. While the parties of the right dominated in many countries in the 
1980s, the 1990s saw the Democrats in the U.S. and Labour in the U.K. make 
significant electoral comebacks – the working class voter who voted for Margaret 
Thatcher in 1983 and 1987 had by no means made a lifetime commitment to 
conservative politics. Moreover, it is far from clear that neoliberalism in its Reagan-
Thatcher guise had much lasting impact outside of the English-speaking world: 
countries such as France, Germany, Italy and Japan, to take some examples, did not 
make policy turns in these directions, and we have noted earlier that there is no clear 
and systemic pattern towards reduced government expenditures in OECD countries 
over the latter quarter of the 20th century.  
 
More generally, theories of the dominant ideology through which Harvey and others 
understand neoliberalism as providing the intellectual underpinnings of a project to 
enhance ruling class power over states and societies are open to the following three 
criticisms: 
 
1. Functionalism, or the propensity to attribute multiple phenomena, from 
reality TV shows to university restructurings to free trade agreements and 
the conduct of monetary policy, to a single causal factor. As Nonini (2008: 
150) has argued in his critique of Harvey’s work as it pertains to China, 
this runs the risk of producing a circular argument where ‘flexible 
capitalism dictates its own conditions of existence to the political systems 
of the nation-states it is organized within’. At its strongest, such theories 
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proclaim that elections ultimately don't matter in liberal democracies, as 
all parties must remain committed to a single ruling class project; 
2. Instrumentalism, or the tendency to see social and political institutions – 
particularly those of government – as little more than the ‘empty shells’ 
that are colonised by ruling class interests to pursue their own conscious 
class strategies. In such accounts, those responsible within state agencies 
who are responsible for the design, enacting and implementation of pubic 
policy appear, as Dunleavy and O’Leary (1987: 239) have observed, as 
‘simply functionaries who make policy according to the rational interests 
of the capitalist class’; 
3. The cipher model of the state – since public policy is essentially the 
outcome of political struggles external to the agencies responsible for it, 
and where ruling class interests have both a coherent program and a 
political ideology – neoliberalism – that underpins it, the state becomes 
essentially ‘a passive mechanism controlled from outside of the formal 
political sphere’ (Dunleavy and O’Leary 1987: 327). Critics have argued 
that such an approach fails to comprehend the significance of state 
institutions as autonomous actors capable of shaping political and 
economic outcomes (Skocpol 2008).  
 
5. Foucault and Marx: Neoliberalism as Hegemony 
 
While some approaches to neoliberalism draw upon an orthodox Marxist political 
economy, proposing that it is the economic ideology of global capitalism or a set of 
false ideas propagated by economic elites to maintain class power, others have drawn 
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upon the more complex set of propositions about the relationship between ideas and 
power derived from the work of Michel Foucault. In particular, the series of lectures 
presented by Foucault at the College de France in 1978-79, published in English 
under the title of The Birth of Biopolitics (Foucault 2008), provide a highly nuanced 
account of the transformation within liberal thought that has come to be termed 
neoliberalism. Drawing upon earlier work on governmentality as a combination of 
political rationalites of governing and techniques of governmental practice (Foucault 
1991), Foucault identifies the rise of neoliberalism in an intellectual reaction to 
Keynesian economics and the welfare state on the one hand, and the priority given to 
market-enabling and market-conforming economic policies in post-WWII Germany 
on the other. While such ideas, associated with the German Ordoliberal school of 
economists and historians, and authors such as Friedrich von Hayek, are relatively 
marginal for much of the 1940s and 1950s, they pick up important adherents in the 
1960s and 1970s, not least through their parallels with the work being undertaken by 
the ‘Chicago School’ of economists in the United States, who propose a more 
thorough ‘generalization of the economic form of the market … throughout the social 
body’ (Foucault 2008: 243), and whose key concepts, such as human capital theory, 
monetarism, and the public choice theory of government action, gain significant 
international influence.  
 
My interest here is not in fully elucidating Foucault’s account of neoliberal 
govenrmentality (see Guala 2006; Gane 2008; Hindess 2009; Tribe 2009; Behrent 
2009; Flew 2012 for such accounts), but rather to consider how it has been deployed 
in some recent critical accounts of neoliberalism. Those who have drawn upon 
Foucault’s work include Brown (2003, 2006), Dean (2008), Couldry (2010) and 
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Miller (2010). Brown proposed that ‘part of what makes neoliberalism “neo” is that it 
depicts free markets, free trade, and entrepreneurial rationality as achieved and 
normative, as promulgated through law and through social and economic policy’, and 
that ‘neoliberalism casts the political and social spheres both as appropriately 
dominated by market concerns and as themselves organized by market rationality’ 
(Brown 2006: 694). Her work associates neoliberalism with ‘a radically free market: 
maximized competition and free trade achieved through economic de-regulation … 
and a range of monetary and social policies favorable to business and indifferent 
toward poverty, social deracination, cultural decimation, long term resource depletion 
and environmental destruction’ (Brown 2003: 1). In such an environment ‘the state 
itself must construct and construe itself in market terms, as well as develop policies 
and promulgate a political culture that figures citizens exhaustively as rational 
economic actors in every sphere of life’ (Brown 2006: 694).  
 
Dean drew upon Foucault to argue that neo-liberalism ‘inverts the early [liberal] 
model of the state as a limiting, external principle supervising the market to make the 
market form itself the regulative principle underlying the state’, thereby ‘reformatting 
social and political life in terms of its ideal of competition within markets’ (Dean 
2008: 48, 49). Miller proposed that Foucault’s work identified the ‘grand 
contradiction of neo-liberalism was its passion for intervention in the name of non-
intervention  … hailing freedom as a natural basis for life that could only function 
with the heavy hand of policing by government to administer property relations’ 
(Miller 2010: 56). Couldry identified neoliberalism as a hegemonic rationality that 
‘presents the social world as made up of markets, and spaces of potential competition 
that need to be organized as markets, blocking other narratives from view’ (Couldry 
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2010: 6).  
 
Although such accounts do not present neoliberalism as the simple application of 
ruling class power through supportive or compliant governments, they are nonetheless 
quite close to conventional Marxist accounts of a dominant ideology. This has led 
Barnett (2005) to observe that such accounts present a ‘trouble-free amalgamation if 
Foucault’s ideas in to the Marxist narrative of “neoliberalism”’, which ‘sets up a 
simplistic image of the world divided between the forces of hegemony and the spirits 
of subversion’ (Barnett 2005: 10). For all the apparent newness in invoking Foucault, 
what emerges is an understanding of neoliberalism as ‘a coherent ideological project 
with clear and unambiguous origins, whose spread is sustained and circulated by an 
identifiable set of institutions’, and which ‘diffuses downwards and outwards from a 
coherent set of institutional sites locate in the United States and Europe’ (Barnett 
2005: 8).  
 
Foucault is invoked in two respects in these accounts of neoliberal hegemony. First, 
neoliberalism is presented as a discourse that can ‘shape pictures of reality’ from 
multiple institutional sites: as Barnett observes, this is a concept of discourse that is 
‘understood instrumentally, as a synonym for ideology’ (Barnett 2005; 9). Second, 
neoliberalism is presented as being able to operate not only at the macro level of state 
power, but at the micro level of individual subjectivities and everyday routines, where 
‘extending the range of activities that are commodified, commercialised and 
marketised necessarily implies that subjectivities have to be re-fitted as active 
consumers, entrepreneurial subjects, participants, and so on’ (Barnett 2005: 9). In the 
large literature that exists in cultural and media studies on reality television and 
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neoliberalism, such programs are seen as providing a ‘staging’ of neoliberal social 
norms that is then – presumably – ‘learned’ by the viewing subjects. For example, 
Couldry argues that Big Brother ‘tracks with striking fidelity the dynamics of the 
contemporary workplace’ (Couldry 2010: 78), including its authority structures, the 
need for teamwork, the need to appear positive, and individualization. It is striking in 
this literature how the proposition that television programs can “do things” to people 
– once one of the most hotly contested concepts in media studies in analyzing the 
text/audience relationship – now seems to have been accepted as a given.  
 
6. Foucault on Neoliberalism 
 
In spite of the invocation of Foucault in these analyses of neoliberalism as a form of 
hegemony, they reproduce three concepts that Foucault himself repeatedly distanced 
his own work from: a top-down analysis of power; a state that is able to act on society 
as a relatively unified and coherent entity; and a dominant ideology that operates as a 
form of social control and as a form of ‘social glue’. There is an extensive literature 
on Foucault’s analysis of power (Hoy 1986; Barrett 1991; McHoul and Grace 1993; 
Hindess 1996), which observes that: power is productive and not simply repressive; 
power is not exercised primarily through domination but rather with the consent of the 
governed; and power is not the opposite of freedom. Hindess describes Foucault’s 
account of power as being based around the proposition that ‘power is exercised over 
those who are in a position to choose, and it aims to influence what those choices will 
be’ (Hindess 1996: 100). In this respect, relations of power are complex, multifaceted 
and diffuse, and ‘a society without power relations can only be an abstraction’ 
(Foucault 1982: 208). The significance of this conception of power is apparent when 
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Foucault’s approach to the state is considered. Contrary to the proposition that the 
state is a more-or-less unified entity that can be ‘captured’ by competing political 
groups, Foucault’s focus is on government, or the ‘instruments, techniques and 
procedures that may be brought to bear on the actions of others’ (Hindess 1996: 100). 
Government in its modern, liberal sense becomes a complex and diffuse array of 
techniques brought to bear upon free subjects, so that ‘successful government of 
others … depends on the ability of those others to govern themselves, and it must 
therefore aim to secure the conditions under which they are enabled to do so’ 
(Hindess 1996: 105). Foucault observed in The Birth of Biopolitics that he avoids a 
theory of the state in the way one would ‘avoid an indigestible meal’, since he views 
‘the state [as] nothing else but the mobile effect of a regime of multiple 
governmentalities’ (Foucault 2008: 77).  
 
The approach, then, which reads Foucault’s account of the rise of neoliberalism as 
charting the emergence of a new form of dominant ideology is, I would propose, 
mistaken. Even more complex Marxian accounts of the relationship between ideas 
and state institutions, such as theories of hegemony, are not consistent with Foucault’s 
account of governmentality since, as Tony Bennett has observed, ‘the mechanisms of 
liberal government do not depend on the production of a generalized form of consent 
… [and] the state … does not possess any general class character or unity’ (Bennett 
1998: 75). 
 
As a way of illustrating some of the differences, it is instructive to compare 
Foucault’s lectures on neoliberalism, which were presented in Paris in 1977-78, to 
Stuart Hall’s essays on ‘Thatcherism’ as a new hegemonic bloc in Britain form the 
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late 1970s onwards (Hall 1988). First, Hall presents Thatcherism as the outcome of 
changing ideologies among sections of the British working class, particularly around 
law and order, consumer society and nationalism. By contrast, Foucault’s account of 
the rise of neoliberalism does not hinge upon changes in electoral behaviour or 
popular consciousness at all; rather, it is consistent with a longstanding series of 
liberal challenges to state authority, that present the market as a countervailing source 
of knowledge and moral authority. From the 1940s onwards, it is challenging not only 
more ‘statist’ forms of government, but also the liberal settlement associated with 
Keynesian economics and the welfare state. Second, Hall retains a theory of the state 
that associates the rise of particular government policies with the interests of certain 
social classes, whereas Foucault is interested in the changing techniques of 
government itself rather than whose interests they are alleged to serve. Third, Hall 
presented the problem for the British left arising from Thatcherism as one of cultural 
modernisation – how its ideas and institutions could win back those sections of the 
population that had shifted allegiance towards the Conservative Party. By contrast, 
Foucault asks what can the left learn about the practices of governing from analysis of 
the rise of neoliberal governmentality. He argues that, in contrast to liberalism: 
 
What socialism lacks is not so much a theory of the state as a governmental 
reason, the definition of what a governmental rationality would be in 
socialism. That is to say, a reasonable and calculable measure of the extent, 
modes, and objectives of government (Foucault 2008: 91-92).  
 
In proposing an alternative reading of Foucault’s The Birth of Biopolitics lectures to 
those which essentially assimilate his contribution into Gramscian neo-Marxism, I 
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would wish to highlight three points (see Flew 2012b for a more detailed analysis). 
First, his genealogy of neoliberalism provides a prescient and remarkable 
contemporary analysis of the relationship of ideas to institutional forms and to modes 
of political practice. Much of the attention given to this book focuses on the second 
part of the book, where he recounts the rise of the Chicago school of neo-classical 
economists and their relationship to theorists such as Hayek. This is the neoliberal 
‘thought collective’ that has been widely discussed due to its perceived influence on 
politics and economics since the 1980s (Mudge 2008; Peck 2008; Mirowski and 
Plehwe 2009; Dean 2012).  
 
But a large part of Foucault’s lectures are devoted to German Ordoliberalism, which 
evolved into the program of the ‘social market economy’, which, by the 1960s, had 
become an orthodoxy among the Social Democratic Party as well as the Christian 
Democratic Party. German Ordoliberalism retained a bias towards what were termed 
‘market-conforming policies’, but that these co-existed with a diverse range of policy 
interventions associated with what was refereed to as vitalpolitik, or a ‘politics of 
life’, that could include regional planning, policies to promote private home 
ownership, initiatives to support small business, and environmental management 
policies: an overarching feature of these was the use of governmental power to 
promote decentralisation (Foucault 2008: 147-148). The idea that this form of neo-
liberalism never saw an active role of government in social policy is simply 
historically inaccurate, and the manner in which it has evolved in Germany bears little 
relationship to a pure laissez faire economic model. There are also fundamental 
differences with Reagan-Thatcher models about the role of institutions such as trade 
unions in the setting of economic policy: in the German model, they are seen as 
 29 
partners in corporate governance and macroeconomic policy setting rather than 
simply as obstacles to unregulated labour markets. The ‘social market economy’ 
variant of neoliberalism can be seen as seeking, as Jamie Peck has observed, ‘an 
appropriate balance between private and public power in order to secure economic 
freedom’, and as involving ‘a search for a distinctive synthesis, located between the 
polar opposites of unfettered capitalism and state control … [that] was not just a 
soggy compromise between the two – a receipt for the mixed economy’ (Peck 2008: 
21, 22).  
 
A second point to be made is that these are the only works of Foucault’s that engage 
with the ideas of Max Weber. Foucault’s account of German social thought identifies 
Weber as the key figure in shifting debate from the Marxist problematic of the 
inherent economic contradictions of capitalism, to ‘the problem he introduced into 
German sociological, economic and political reflection … [which] is not so much the 
contradictory logic of capital as the problem of the irrational rationality of capitalist 
society’ (Foucault 2008: 105). This was not to say that capitalism was a crisis-free or 
self-managing system at the economic level. Indeed, the divide between the 
Keynesian liberals and the neoliberals revolved around the question of whether 
government policies to address such problems needed to be market correcting or 
market conforming: the differing views on how to address the tendency of 
competition to produce monopolies is a classic instance of such debates. But at a 
broader level, even the well-functioning capitalist market economy – which Weber, 
unlike Marx, believed could emerge – generates a range of tensions and 
contradictions at the social level, particularly in terms of the ‘principle of 
dissociation’ of market relations on civil society, and on ‘the active bonds of 
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compassion, benevolence, love for one’s fellows, and sense of community’, arising 
from a market-based understanding of the social as one which entails ‘picking out the 
egoist interest of individuals, emphasising it, and making it more incisive’ (Foucault 
2008: 302). For Foucault, in these lectures at least, Weber’s approach to 
understanding the tensions in market society, between egoist economic relations 
through the market on the one hand and the broader functioning of civil society on the 
other, provides a more fruitful means of grasping the tensions of liberal government 
than the more traditional Marxist problematic.  
 
The appeal of Weber, in this regard, arises from the equal weighting his work gives to 
the economic and legal relations of capitalism, as distinct from viewing juridical 
relations as ‘being in a relation of pure and simple expression or instrumentality to the 
economy’ (Foucault 2008: 162). By rejecting the proposition that economic relations 
determine a particular socio-legal order, and hence seeing the legal and institutional 
framework as providing the ‘conditions of possibility’ (Foucault, 2008: 163) for 
particular economic relations to emerge at different moments of historical time, it is 
possible to develop a more historically grounded, and less formalistic, account of 
capitalist economic relations: 
 
The economic must be considered as a set of regulated activities from the very 
beginning: it is a set of regulated activities with rules of completely different 
levels, forms, origins, dates, and chronologies; rules which may comprise a 
social habitus, a religious prescription, an ethics, a corporative regulation, and 
also a law (Foucault 2008: 163).  
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Third, by making this distinction between an abstract ‘capital’ that exists purely in 
thought, and a historically and institutionally formed capitalism that varies over time, 
and between states, we can start to see how reforms to institutions and to the legal 
framework can reshape economic relations. The paradox that emerges is that, for 
Foucault, the neoliberal theorists he considers in The Birth of Biopolitics understood 
this better than the Marxists, rather than being the crude dogmatic adherents of free 
market fundamentalism that they are typically portrayed as. By positing the 
possibility of governing through the market, as a variant of the historical question of 
how to engage in governing-at-a-distance that has long been a feature of liberal 
thought about government, such theorists break out of ‘a simple evaluative opposition 
between individualism and collectivism, the private and the public’ (Barnett 2005: 
11). 
 
Neoliberalism provides at least two historical examples of a pragmatics of 
government which involves ‘a coupling of a set of practices and a regime of truth 
[that] forms an apparatus (dispositif) of knowledge-power (Foucault 2008: 19). By 
contrast, much of the recent literature that assimilates Foucault’s work into a neo-
Marxist critique of neoliberalism as a dominant ideology of global capitalism remains 
within binary oppositions of public and private, collective and individual, and state 
and market. By assuming that neoliberalism is fundamentally an economic form of 
government, it ignores Foucault’s observation that economics can be ‘lateral to the art 
of governing’, but ‘economic science cannot be the science of government, and 
economics cannot be the internal principle, law, rule of conduct, or rationality of 
government’ (Foucault 2008: 286). As a result, there is a consistent struggle to 
identify a different set of policy practices that could constitute an alternative form of 
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governmentality, and would involve a different mix of economic and other policy 
instruments and mechanisms. 
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Figure 1 
 
Use of the terms ‘monetarism’ and ‘neoliberalism’ 1980-2010 (as 
measured by Google Ngram) 
 
 
Source: Google, accessed 9 March, 2012.  
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Figure 2 
 
Government Spending in 13 OECD Nations, 1980-2009 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Micklethwait, 2011.   
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1  A wide range of factors can affect these shares over and above the policy decisions 
of governments. Involvement in wars will generally see the government share of GDP 
increase, as in the U.S. over the 2000s, as did the bailout of financial institutions in 
both the U.S. and Britain over 2008-2009. More generally, positive terms of trade 
tend to reduce the government share of GDP (by increasing the net wealth of the 
private sector), while government spending as a percentage of GDP tends to 
negatively correlate with trends in the business cycle, decreasing during the upswing 
(while taxation revenues increase), and increasing during the downswing (as taxation 
revenues decrease).  
 
 
